

*W. J. Taylor*

STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE FIRST CLASS,  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, 4  
FEBRUARY 1948.

General Taylor, Members of the First Class of  
the Academy:

It is with a double sense of pleasure that I  
face you this ~~morning~~<sup>evening</sup> in response to the more than  
kind invitation of your ~~Commandant~~<sup>Superintendent</sup>. He has asked me  
to talk with you on the importance to the national  
defense of so-called high level intelligence, to expand  
on the general subject of intelligence requirements for  
the national security, and to describe to you the work  
of our Central Intelligence Agency.

It gives me a warm sense of satisfaction to be  
able to come to West Point and enjoy its hospitality.  
It has afforded me an opportunity to make a most in-  
teresting discovery and that is that all of you sitting  
before me are just normal sized human beings. My

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recollection of certain events which took place in the Philadelphia stadium last November is that some of you were of gigantic, superman size -- a collective colossus running through, around and over a Navy team which was composed of mere mortals. I am happy to note that you are all sitting quietly and will not be trampling over me -- at least until the question period starts.

To me, moreover, there is a great deal of significance in being invited to discuss intelligence with you. Intelligence has achieved the position which it has so long deserved in your curriculum, as well as in the curriculum of such advanced service training schools as the Command and General Staff School, the Air University, the Naval War College,

the Armed Forces Staff College and the National War College. This means at last that the overwhelming importance which intelligence must play in the security of the nation is being realized to the fullest extent.

I want to present the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency to you in some detail so that you may understand it as a vibrant going concern rather than just another group of Washington letters. Before discussing our task with you, however, there are certain things I wish to say as background. As I have indicated, there has been an enormous growth over the past few years in the appreciation of intelligence matters. If, as you graduate from here, that appreciation goes with you

in ever increasing amounts and continues to grow throughout your career, it will make an important contribution to the security of this country.

This increased appreciation is due in part to a full realization of our pre-war failures in the field of intelligence. In Washington some of it is due to the reduction of our armed forces as they approach their peace-time complement. It is axiomatic that the more the actual combat forces are reduced the greater is the role that must be played by intelligence. Commanders in all grades have expressed a high regard for operational intelligence.

As General Spaatz said recently, in testifying before the President's Air Policy Commission:

EXCERPT FROM SPEECH BY GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY

AT INDUSTRY ARMY DAY PROGRAM - DALLAS, TEXAS - 23 JAN 48

IT IS ONLY THROUGH OUR RELIANCE UPON THE SKILLS, ABILITY AND  
INVENTIVENESS OF THESE INSTITUTIONS AND INDUSTRIES THAT THE  
ARMY CAN HOPE TO MAINTAIN ITS SUPERIORITY OVER THE EQUIPMENT  
AND WEAPONS OF OTHER NATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE  
HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY TO KEEP US ADEQUATELY INFORMED OF PROGRESS ELSEWHERE.  
WE ARE CLEARLY AWARE THAT IT IS ONLY BY TRAINING COMPETENT  
MEN IN A LIFETIME CAREER OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE THAT THE  
UNITED STATES CAN HOPE TO DRAW ON THE EXPERIENCE, WISDOM,  
AND THE HUMAN RESOURCES NECESSARY TO KEEP US SECURELY INFORMED.  
WE KNOW IT IS THIS FACTUAL INFORMATION THAT CAN MAKE THE  
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOOD JUDGMENT AND BAD JUDGMENT, BETWEEN  
SAFETY AND DANGER.

"I think Intelligence must be exploited to the maximum. We must spend all that is necessary to get the best Intelligence."

Testifying before the same Commission, Admiral Nimitz suggested that the Commission

". . . give thought to the importance of intelligence to our national security. The greater the capabilities of our enemies for sudden attack, the more important it becomes that our intelligence agencies and activities be the best that we can devise."

From this knowledge, gained through the experiences of the past decade, an appreciation of

intelligence has spread through the highest ranks  
and agencies of our Government.

I stated at the very beginning that the Superintendent had asked me to discuss intelligence at a high level. Before I enter into any further remarks, I think it is necessary to define exactly what is meant. To do this, I would say that the departments of the military establishment -- Army, Navy and the Air Forces and the State Department each need and receive

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through their own collection activities what could best be described as tactical intelligence. It is that information which each department needs for its own day-to-day operations. The heads of each Government department and agency must be constantly informed of the situation within their own fields to discharge their obligations to this Country. But over and beyond this type of intelligence, which we call departmental intelligence, there is what we know as national intelligence, which is occasionally described as "high level intelligence" or "strategic intelligence" or "national security intelligence". We define national intelligence as that composite intelligence, inter-departmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officials and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war

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and for the advancement of broad national policy.  
National intelligence is in that broad political-  
economic-military area of concern to more than one  
agency. It must be objective and it must transcend  
the exclusive competence of any one department.

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All intelligence is not sinister, nor is it an invidious type of work. There are many ways of illustrating just what intelligence is -- beyond the cold definition of the word. A manner which I have found particularly helpful is to consider the intelligence estimate of a nation as a kind of super jigsaw puzzle. When first seen, the pieces of this picture are all confused; the analysts start working and eventually there emerges a partial solution, about 75% of the puzzle. This part is the pieces that are available from overt sources-- books, charts, periodicals, radio broadcasts, technical surveys, photographs, commercial surveys, general information, etc. Now, we have 75% of a picture, showing that much of the capabilities

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and potentials of our target country. There are still gaps and omissions and to fill these we must resort to clandestine and covert methods. By use of such means we can get perhaps 15% more, thus making our picture 90% complete. At this point, by deduction we can get perhaps 5% more. The final 5% is most probably unattainable as it consists of ideas and policies not even formulated, existing only in the minds of the leaders of our target country. However, the 95% we do have should give, within narrow limits, the potential, the capabilities, and the probable and possible intentions of our target.

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In discussing with you the subject of national intelligence, I think we must begin by recalling to mind the chaotic condition of our intelligence prior to World War Two.

I think it can be said without successful challenge that before Pearl Harbor we did not have an intelligence service in this country comparable to that of Great Britain, or France, or Russia, or Germany, or Japan. We did not have one because the people of the United States would not accept it. It was felt that there was something un-American about espionage and even about intelligence generally.

As the United States found itself suddenly projected into a global war, immense gaps in our knowledge became readily apparent. The word

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"intelligence" quickly took on a fashionable connotation. Each new war-time agency -- as well as the older departments -- soon blossomed out with intelligence staffs of their own, each producing a mass of uncoordinated information. The resultant competition for funds and specialized personnel was a monumental example of waste. The War and Navy Departments developed full Political and Economic Intelligence Staffs, as did the Research and Analysis Division of O. S. S. The Board of Economic Warfare and its successor, the Foreign Economic Administration, also delved deeply into the fields of economic intelligence. Not content with staffs in Washington, they established subsidiary staffs in London, and then followed these up with other units on the Continent and in the

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Pacific areas.

When, for example, officials requested a report on the steel industry of Japan or the economic conditions in the Netherlands East Indies, they had to choose from the reports of the Board of Economic Warfare, G-2, ONI, or the O. S. S. -- just to name a few. And, because these agencies had competed to secure the best personnel, it was necessary for each of them to back up its experts by asserting that its reports were the best available and that the others might well be disregarded.

During the war, the Office of Strategic Services -- O. S. S. -- was established for the purpose of gathering together men of exceptional background and ability who could operate in the

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field of national, rather than departmental, intelligence. In weighing the merits of the O. S. S., one should remember that it came late into the field. It was a stop-gap. Overnight it was given a function to perform that the British, for example, had been developing aggressively since the days of Queen Elizabeth. When one considers these facts, the work of the O. S. S. was quite remarkable and its known failures must be weighed against its successes. Moreover, it marked a crucial turning point in the development of our intelligence system and we profit greatly by its experiences and mistakes.

The Joint Congressional Committee, which investigated the attack on Hawaii, reached many pertinent conclusions, in 1946, regarding the shortcomings of our intelligence system and made some very sound recommendations for its improvement. Most of

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these have been incorporated into our present thinking.

The Committee showed that some very significant information had not been correctly evaluated. It found that some of the evaluated information was not passed on to field commanders. But -- over and above these failures were others more serious -- which went to the very foundation of our intelligence structure. I am speaking now of the failure to exploit obvious sources; the failure to coordinate the collection and dissemination of intelligence; the failure to centralize intelligence.

The Committee recommended that intelligence work have centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility. It found specific fault with the system of dissemination --

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or, more accurately, the lack of dissemination.

It stated that "the security of the nation can be insured only through continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in those charged with handling intelligence."

It found that there is no substitute for resourcefulness on the part of intelligence personnel, and that part of the failure in this respect was "failure to accord to intelligence work the important and significant role which it deserves."

The Committee declared that "efficient intelligence services are just as essential in times of peace as in war."

I can not stress too heavily to you who are about to graduate the conclusion which the Pearl Harbor Committee reached that "officers be selected for intelligence work who possess the background, penchant, and capacity for such work; and that they

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be maintained in the work for an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating material received." The Committee urged, and the senior commanders in our armed forces agree, that an officer who has an aptitude for intelligence work should serve in this field and that this service will not impede his progress nor affect his promotions. Tangible evidence of this feeling that those who serve in intelligence should be entitled to promotion was seen in many grades during the latter days of the war. It received powerful support last month by the nomination by the President of the Director of Intelligence of the Department of the Army, Major General Stephen J. Chamberlin to the rank

of Lieutenant General. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, E. K. Wright, has been promoted from Colonel to Brigadier General during his incumbency of that position. Continued service in the intelligence field has had shining examples such as Major General George C. McDonald, who as a Colonel and Brigadier General was Chief of Intelligence to General Spaatz in North Africa, Europe and Washington, and currently serves as a Major General as Chief of Air Intelligence at the headquarters of the United States Air Force. Major General Clayton Bissell served successively as A-2, G-2 and now Military Attache in London. I am sure General Taylor will bear me out when I state that an officer can contribute great service by specializing in intelligence during

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his military career. The thought that promotion can only come from service in the line, that one must be in command position rather than in staff, is as obsolete as the sword and cutlass. If I could but leave this one thought with you above all and impress upon you its seriousness -- if I could make you see that there are techniques in intelligence as complex as tactical maneuvers, then my trip will have been many times repaid.

The end of the war found the United States in a position of international importance and power in a very unstable world -- and that position maintains today. We must never again find ourselves confronted with the necessity for developing plans and policies on the basis of intelligence collected, compiled, and interpreted by a foreign government. It is common knowledge that we found ourselves in just that position, as regarded the European Theatre,

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at the beginning of the war. For months we had to rely blindly and trustingly on the superior intelligence system of the British. Our successes prove that this trust was well placed.

However, in matters so vital to a nation having responsibilities of a world power, the United States must never again be forced to go, hat in hand, begging a foreign government for the eyes -- the foreign intelligence -- with which to see.

Our war experience in the intelligence field, the conclusions of the Joint Congressional Committee which investigated the Hawaiian attack, and the studies of many other groups and committees, focused attention on the need for a centralized intelligence system.

As most of you know, a National Intelligence Authority was established by President Truman on

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22 January 1946, by Executive Directive. The Central Intelligence Group was designated as the operating agency of the National Intelligence Authority.

Since the Central Intelligence Group has now been legalized by the National Security Act of 1947 -- under the new name of the Central Intelligence Agency -- I shall not discuss the old organization further -- but will proceed to the new.

With this background, I would like to discuss with you the pertinent provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, insofar as they affect the intelligence picture. This Act establishes -- for the first time on a legal basis -- a National Security Council, the function of which is to advise the President on the integration of foreign, domestic and military policies relating to the national security. The Council is to be presided over by the President

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himself, or by any member he may designate. Its membership is composed of the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, together with certain others who may be appointed at the option of the President.

The Central Intelligence Agency is established under this Council. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the National Security Council will take the place of the National Intelligence Authority, which is specifically abolished by the Act. The law does not set forth the powers of the Council as they relate to our Agency, in the manner in which the President's original Executive Order delineated the powers of the National Intelligence Authority in relation to the Central Intelligence Group. However,

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the fact that the Agency is placed under the Council would appear to give the Council the same general authorities for directing the planning, development, and coordination of all Federal foreign intelligence activities which the National Intelligence Authority had before it.

The Act specifically provides for a Director of Central Intelligence, who is to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from either civilian or military life. Certain additional safeguards are then included, so that the Director shall not be subject to the usual supervision, restrictions and prohibitions which apply to members of the armed services. It further states that he is not to possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers or functions -- other than those he

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would exercise as Director -- over any component of the armed services. These clauses were included in order to assure to the satisfaction of the Congress that the Director would be free from undue service politics and influence.

The law specifically provides that our Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions. This provision was also in the old Executive Order, and it is one which we are very happy to have included in the law. We have consistently urged that Central Intelligence have nothing whatsoever to do with police powers or functions connected with the internal security of the United States. The internal security functions are properly a part of the work of the F. B. I., and we have no desire whatsoever to interfere with this. It is a burden which we do not wish to assume.

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During the Congressional hearings which preceded the passage of this Act, Central Intelligence was under attack as a possible and incipient Gestapo. We held that this argument had no basis in fact, since a Gestapo can arise only when police powers and intelligence are combined in one organization. We pointed out time and again that our interests are solely in the field of foreign intelligence. Therefore, as I have said, we welcome this provision in the law which eliminates any possibility that our organization will merge intelligence with police power, or assume any functions relative to the internal security of the United States.

And now I wish to discuss with you certain provisions of the law relating to the specific duties of the Agency. These duties were enacted "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities

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of the several Governmental departments and agencies in the interest of national security." In other words,-- bearing in mind the great powers to recommend the integration of foreign, domestic and military policies of this Government which have been assigned to the National Security Council -- it becomes apparent that the Central Intelligence Agency is to serve as the intelligence advisor to the Council on all matters respecting national intelligence.

The next duty imposed upon us by the Act is to make recommendations to the Council for the coordination of the intelligence activities of the Government insofar as they relate to the national security. Under the President's Executive Order, the Director of Central Intelligence was assisted by what was known as the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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This Board consisted of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, the Director of Intelligence of the Army Department General Staff, the Chief of Naval Intelligence, and the Director of Intelligence, United States Air Force. To these have now been added the Director of Security and Intelligence of the Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Gingrich, and the Director of the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Brigadier General Todd. While there is no specific statutory provision for the continuance of the Intelligence Advisory Board, the law permits the appointment of necessary advisory committees, and we will maintain this Board and continue to lean on it for advice in all phases of our activities. It enables us to keep in close and intimate contact with the

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departmental intelligence agencies of the Government. In addition, provision is made to invite the heads of other intelligence agencies of the Government than those mentioned before, to sit as members of the Advisory Board on all matters which would affect their agencies. In this manner, the Board serves to furnish the Director with the benefits of the knowledge, advice, experience, viewpoints, and over-all requirements of the departments with respect to intelligence. These recommendations, when adopted, can serve as the basis of many of the Director's recommendations to the Council for the coordination of our Government's intelligence activities.

This planned coordination is of particular importance in determining primary fields of intelligence responsibilities of the various departments

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and agencies. We are -- in the fields of collection, production, and dissemination -- working to prevent overlapping functions; that is, to eliminate duplicate roles and missions, and to eliminate duplicate services in carrying out these functions.

The next paragraph of the law provides for the correlation and evaluation within the Government of intelligence relating to the national security. This is a major component of a successful Central Intelligence Agency, coming under the broad general heading of production, and including the evaluation, correlation and interpretation of the foreign intelligence information gathered for the production of intelligence. It involves the process of systematic and critical examination of intelligence information for the purpose of determining its usefulness, credibility and accuracy. It involves the synthesis

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of the particular intelligence information with all available related material. It involves the process of determining the probable significance of evaluated intelligence.

Information gathered in the field is sent to the department responsible for its collection. As I stated at the opening of my remarks, this information is necessary to that department in its day-to-day operations. It is their tactical -- or, as we call it, departmental -- intelligence. Each department must have personnel available to digest this information and put it to such use as is necessary within that department. With this departmental necessity, Central Intelligence will not interfere. Each department must evaluate and correlate and interpret that intelligence information which is within its own exclusive competence and which is needed for its own departmental use.

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The importance of research to the Central Intelligence Agency becomes evident when we start to deal with intelligence on a national as distinguished from a departmental level. The research provided by the central agency must be turned to the production of estimates in the field of national intelligence, which I defined previously as transcending the exclusive competence of any one department.

One of the greatest contributions which a Central Intelligence Agency makes is the preparation of national intelligence estimates. Such an estimate, for instance, was prepared by us on the situation in Turkey at the time when the President expounded the doctrine of aid to Turkey. Previously, if the President desired an over-all estimate of a given situation, he had to call for example, upon the War Department, which would furnish him with the military and air

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picture; the Navy Department, which would present an estimate of the naval potentialities and capabilities; and on the State Department, which would cover the political and sociological picture. But nowhere would there be an over-all estimate. Each department would, of necessity, present an estimate slanted to its own particular field. Now it falls to the Central Intelligence Agency to present this over-all picture in a balanced national intelligence estimate including all pertinent data. From this the President and appropriate officials can draw a well-rounded picture on which to base their policies. And it should be clearly borne in mind that the Central Intelligence Agency does not make policy.

The estimates furnished in the form of strategic and national policy intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency fill a most serious gap

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in our present intelligence structure. These estimates should represent the most comprehensive, complete and precise national intelligence available to the Government. Without a central research staff producing this material, an intelligence system would merely resemble a costly group of factories, each manufacturing component parts, without a central assembly line for the finished product.

The Act also charges us with the appropriate dissemination of national intelligence within the Government. Indeed, dissemination is always a major component of a successful intelligence operation. You will recall that one of the great faults found by the Joint Congressional Committee was the failure of appropriate dissemination of some of the wonderful intelligence we had available to us. Just as there is no purpose in collecting intelligence information unless it is subsequently analyzed and

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worked into a final product, so there is no sense in developing a final product if it is not disseminated to those who have need of it. The dissemination of intelligence is mandatory to those officials of the Government who need it to make their decisions.

A Central Intelligence Agency, properly cognizant of the intelligence requirements of the various departments and agencies, is best equipped to handle the dissemination to all departments of the national intelligence material to meet these requirements. The complexities of intelligence, the immensities of information available virtually for the asking, are so great that this information must reach a central spot for orderly and efficient dissemination to all possible users within the Government.

Special mention is made in the unification act of the fact that the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect,

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evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence. A little earlier I mentioned to you the distinction between departmental intelligence on the one hand and national intelligence on the other. We have seen, as I have previously stated, how two of the major components of intelligence -- namely, production and dissemination -- are handled in Central Intelligence. I now wish to turn for a few minutes to the third major component -- collection.

The role of the Central Intelligence Agency is to coordinate this collection of foreign intelligence information and to avoid wasteful duplication. The State Department should collect political, economic, and sociological intelligence in its basic field. The Department of the Army should devote its efforts primarily to the collection of military intelligence. There should be no reason,

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for example, for the military attache to furnish the Department of the Army with detailed political and politico - economic analyses. This material should be collected by the State Department. If a military attache should receive political information, he should hand it right across the desk in the embassy to the appropriate member of the Foreign Service, and vice versa.

We are engaged in making continual surveys of all Governmental agencies to ascertain their requirements in foreign intelligence. When two or more agencies have similar or identical requirements, the collection effort for one can be made to satisfy all others. The only additional action necessary is the additional dissemination.

I feel it is safe to say that in peace time approximately 75 per cent of the foreign intelligence

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information necessary to successful operation can and should be collected by overt means. By overt means, I mean those obvious, open methods which require, basically, a thorough sifting and analysis of the masses of readily available material of all types and descriptions. Into the United States there is funnelled so vast an amount of information from so many varied sources that it is virtually staggering. It encompasses every field of endeavor -- military, political, economic, commercial, financial, agricultural, mineral, labor, scientific, technical, among others -- an endless and inexhaustible supply.

If we fail to take advantage of these vast masses of material, we are deliberately exposing the American people to the consequences of a policy dictated by a lack of information. We must realize also that we are competing with other nations who

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have been building up their intelligence systems for centuries to keep their leaders informed of international intentions -- to inform them long before intentions have materialized into action.

Among the primary collecting agencies in the field of foreign intelligence are the military, air and naval attaches of the defense establishment, and the Foreign Service officers of the State Department. The Central Intelligence Agency can not and will not supplant these people. They do most valuable work in the field of collection. As national aims and needs in this field are established, their value will be increasingly apparent. This will be particularly true as the boundaries of departmental collection become firmly defined, and wasteful duplication and overlap are eliminated or reduced.

As I stated, it is not the province of the Central Intelligence Agency to take over departmental

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collection activities. This is the type of collection which can best be done by the experts of the departments in their various fields.

The law provides one section which establishes the right of the Agency to collect certain intelligence material, and I shall quote this section verbatim: "To perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." This section is written primarily to allow the Agency to engage in foreign clandestine operations -- to give to the United States, for the first time, the espionage system which is, unfortunately, made necessary by conditions in the world today. In addition, it allows us to perform certain collection and other functions which would otherwise have to be done individually by each of the

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intelligence agencies of the Government -- State, Army, Air, Navy, and the rest. However, when these functions are performed centrally, the savings and services derived are considerable. As a result, the various agencies welcome the benefits gained from such centralization and no longer wish to perform these functions themselves. I will cite you two examples.

We have taken over the exploitation of captured foreign documents. These functions were formerly performed, in connection with Japanese documents, by the Washington Document Center, a joint service venture. Similarly, we have taken over the German Document Center, formerly operated by the War Department. It has been felt that this type of function can be most economically and efficiently performed by a central agency such as ours, for it pools the skilled linguistic personnel and the dissemination

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functions.

Secondly, we have assumed responsibility for the operation of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, which monitors approximately two million words of foreign broadcasts a day. This service rested with Federal Communications Commission during the war, and was subsequently transferred to the War Department. The Army and Navy Departments are both big users of this material, but the State Department is perhaps the biggest user of the three. Therefore, this function was an unwarranted burden on any one departmental budget. It was finally determined to centralize the operation in the Central Intelligence Group as one which could best be performed centrally. Thus many agencies of the Government receive this service. I hasten to add that the monitoring of foreign broadcasts is becoming an

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increasingly important source of information. It is able to bring in valuable information a great deal faster than normal attache channels. Moreover, a continual study of a country's broadcasts over a protracted period of time brings further intelligence which can be secured by no other means.

To give an example of the worth of this monitoring, I can cite the fact that when the Secretary of State, General Marshall, went to Moscow last March, he requested and we furnished him with a daily roundup of 500 words on Soviet broadcasts regarding the German and Austrian treaties. When the President, shortly after General Marshall's departure, enunciated the Truman Doctrine, we added monitoring reports of foreign reaction to the Doctrine to our daily roundup for the Secretary in Moscow.

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Recently the Arab League held a conference in  
Cairo. In a broadcast intercept in [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] which apparently was an oversight in the  
security measures of the Arab League Conference,  
the text of the decisions was released. There were  
no subsequent broadcasts or releases on the Arab  
League Conference. Consequently without the monitor-  
ing service of the FBIE this information would not  
have been available to us for weeks, if ever.

In October of 1947, TASS, the Soviet news  
agency, broadcast a communique which reported the  
formation of the Cominform. The FBIE, having monitored  
the TASS communique, immediately set to work to  
determine the reaction of radios throughout the

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world. On the following day the FBIB was able to present a cross section of world reaction and within the next two days the Soviet reaction was broadcast as an excerpt from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. CIA had the information 2 or 3 days earlier than would have been the case without FBIB monitoring.

At about the same time that the Cominform was front-page news with Commercial press services the FBIB picked up the first notice of the Communist worldwide attack on Socialists when it heard Radio Bratislava announce the arrest of Czechoslovakian right-wing democrats.

Two examples of specific intelligence gleaned from broadcasts over a long period are the reports on the "Soviet Transportation System" and the "Status of Soviet Agriculture", in which all of the data on one subject from one source were presented in brief

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form for use by research analysts making studies based on all sources.)

Finally, I have stated that this section of the law, which instructs us to perform certain functions centrally, is used as the cloak to hide the right to operate the clandestine services of the United States which have been assigned to us by the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

The collection of information by this means has been over-dramatized, and unfortunately, over-publicized. However, I believe we should frankly acknowledge the need for and provide the means of collecting that intelligence which can be obtained only by clandestine methods. In this we only follow, late by many years, the policy and example of every major foreign power. When properly provided for and established, these operations must be centralized

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in one organization. The experience of the British Secret Intelligence Service over hundreds of years proves this. The Germans violated this principle -- as did the Italians and the Japanese -- with disastrous results for themselves.

Failure always marks a multiplicity of secret intelligence organizations. Study of many intelligence systems throughout the world, talks with those who have operated in the field of secret intelligence for long periods of time, and post-war interrogations of high intelligence officials in the Axis countries, have shown conclusively that when there are separate services, the result is chaos, so far as production of information is concerned. Internal bickering, with continual sniping, develops between the various services. There were too many German spy organizations, each of them

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jealous of the other. They all developed a policy of secrecy, so that each might be the one to present some juicy tidbit of information to the leaders. Coordination went out the window.

If the United States is to enter clandestine operations in any area abroad, then such operations should be centralized in one agency to avoid the mistakes indicated, and we should follow the experience of the intelligence organizations of other countries which have proven successful in this field.

I have spoken quite frankly to you of the fact that your country is engaged in espionage. As future officers, you should know this. But remember that this is secret information -- not for discussion. Many newspapers and columnists have guessed at it. It has never been officially admitted -- it never will be. Forget it.

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We have been using big words and high sounding phrases. Suppose in closing, that I leave these thoughts for you to remember:

First, that, in my opinion, the field of intelligence has at last reached the stage where it offers to the graduates of this Academy a service career second to none in importance.

Second, that there is the daily need in the Military Establishment and the State Department for tactical or departmental intelligence. But over and beyond that is the need of the President and the top officials of the government for objective national intelligence transcending the interests and competence of any one department of the government.

Third, that national intelligence is prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency breaks down into the three basic fundamentals of

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intelligence -- certain types of collection, production, and dissemination.

Finally, let me sum up my concept of what a successful national intelligence estimate should be in the lines of "The Elephant's Child," by Rudyard Kipling, who said:

"I keep six honest serving men.

(They taught me all I knew.)

Their names are What and Why

and When

And How and Where and Who."

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